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Abstract
I examine a common market with the following institutions. Oligopolis-
tic firms improve their productivity by R&D. Wages are determined
by union-employer bargaining. Firms and workers lobby the author-
ity that accepts new members and regulates unions’ and firms’ market
power. The main findings are as follows. Small common markets have
incentives to expand, but large ones are indifferent to new members.
With product market deregulation, there is an upper limit for the size
of the common market and the growth rate diminishes with integra-
tion.
Journal of Economic Literature: F15, J50, O40
Keywords: economic integration, labor unions, market power,
endogenous technological change
Corresponding author:
Tapio Palokangas, Department of Economics, P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7),
FIN-00014 University of Helsinki, Finland. Phone +358 9 191 28735,
Fax +358 9 191 28736, Email: Tapio.Palokangas@helsinki.fi
∗Financial support from the Yrjo¨ Jahnsson Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. I am
also grateful to Arkady Kryazhimskiy, Chihiro Watanabe and the other participants of the
IIASA-Tokyotech Mini-workshop in Laxenburg, Austria, May 1-2, 2008, for constructive
comments.
1 Introduction
During the latest decades, the European Union (EU) has expanded consider-
ably. This expansion results from a rather complicated process which involves
bargaining and lobbying in the EU. On the one hand, the integration has di-
minished rents which has raised opposition among different interest groups,
but, on the other hand, the deregulation of rents has been suggested as the
remedy for slow growth and weak international competitiveness of the EU.
This paper attempts to model the expansion of a common market as s polit-
ical process. In order to have interest groups, I introduce wage bargaining,
and in order to have a plausible role of rents, I introduce endogenous techno-
logical change into the model. This framework can be used as a benchmark
for considering the problems of growth and economic integration.
The growth effects of regulation depend decisively on the structure of
economy. Where the same technology is used both in production and in
R&D, the economy behaves as if the same final good were used both in
consumption and in R&D. In that specific case, labor market regulation can
be only growth-hampering: an increase in union power decreases profits,
incentives to invest in R&D and the growth rate (cf. Peretto 1998). In this
study, I assume that there is different technology for production and R&D.1
With this specification, there can be a positive dependence union power and
technological change through cost-escaping R&D as follows. With higher
union wages, firms have more incentives to improve the productivity of labor
through R&D. This increases investment in R&D and the growth rate.
There is also some empirical evidence on a positive relationship between
R&D and labor market regulation. Caballero (1993) and Hoon and Phelps
(1997) show that changes in unemployment and productivity growth are
positively associated. Some papers explain R&D by the unionization rate,
i.e. the ratio of unionized to all workers,2 but this is a different issue.3
1I take this to the extreme so that R&D employs only labor, for simplicity.
2Addison and Wagner (1994) found a positive cross-sectional correlation, but Menezes-
Filho et.al. (1998) only little correlation in a panel of firms, between R&D and the
unionization rate in the UK. Connolly et.al. (1986), Hirsch (1990; 1992), Bronars et.al.
(1994) in the USA, and Betts et.al. (2001) in Canada found a negative cross-sectional
correlation between these. Hence, the results have been highly institution-specific.
3The unionization rate is not a proper proxy for union power in wage bargaining. In
many European countries it tells nothing about union power, because the contract made by
1
Except cost-escaping, there has been also other attempts to explain a
positive wage-growth relationship as follows. Cahuc and Michel (1996) (using
an OLG model), as well as Agell and Lommerud (1997) (using an extensive
game framework) show that a minimum wage creates an incentive for workers
to accumulate human capital. Meckl (2004) extends Aghion and Howitt’s
(1998) Schumpeterian growth model so that production employs skilled and
unskilled, but R&D only skilled labor. He shows that higher minimum wages
for unskilled labor raise employment of skilled labor and the growth rate.
Palokangas (1996, 2000) introduces wage bargaining into Romer’s (1990)
product-variety model. He shows that if the elasticity of substitution between
skilled and unskilled labor is less than one, then an increase in union power
raises wages for unskilled workers, reduces the demand for skilled workers
in production, and thereby lowers wages for skilled workers. This decreases
costs in R&D and promotes growth. Lingens (2003) and Palokangas (2004,
2005) reconstruct the same effect for Schumpeterian and R&D-based growth
models. In this study, however, I stick to the assertion of cost-escaping,
because it provides a more direct link between rents and technological change.
The prospect of losing rents due to economic integration is also an impor-
tant issue. Dinopoulos and Zhao (2004) develop a two-sector general equilib-
rium model of a small open economy unionized and non-unionized firms. To
identify economic conditions for anti-globalization arguments, they analyze
how economic integration affects the allocation of resources, labor effort and
the structure of wages. They, however, postulate a union’s utility as a geo-
metric average of the wage and employment and assume that labor unions
ignore the effect of their wages on productivity through R&D. In contrast,
I analyze a union of countries, not a small economy, derive a union’s prefer-
ences directly from workers’ preferences and assume that unions are aware
of how their wage policy affects their members’ employment through R&D.
I organize the remainder of this study as follows. In section 2, I present
the institutional setting of the study as an extended game. As a part of
the representative union is extended to cover all employers and employees in the industry.
In some other countries (e.g. USA, Canada), unions can make agreements only for their
members and a unionized worker can be easily replaced by a non-unionized worker. This
imposes an additional constraint for the union in wage bargaining, but does not necessarily
affect the relative bargaining power of the parties.
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this game, I construct specific models for households in section 3, firms in 4,
wage bargaining in 5 and for the common market in 6. Finally, I analyze the
political equilibrium in section 7 and economic integration in 8 and 9.
2 The setting
I consider a common market that contains a number J of similar regions.4 A
member country of the common market is comprised of a smaller number (<
J) of regions. Each region contains a fixed amount L of labor, a representative
firm and a representative labor union. To examine the political economy of
growth and economic integration, the model is then composed as follows:
(i) All firms produce one unit of output from one labor unit. The oligopolis-
tic competition of the firms determines prices in the common market.
(ii) Because the new members have access to the same technology and must
adopt the same institutions as the old members, economic integration
can be characterized by the increase in the size J of the common market.
An expansion of the common market intensifies competition.
(iii) Workers and firms bargain over wages.
(iv) Firms invest in R&D to escape production costs.
(v) I call the decision maker of the common market as the central planner.
It regulates the product and labor markets and accepts new members
to the common market. The central planner has its own interests and
it is lobbied by interest groups that represent workers and firms.
In this model, the common market expands by accepting new regions
as members, and any opposition to economic integration manifests itself as
an upper limit that the political process sets for the common market. I
summarize the institutional structure of the model as follows:
Representatives in Representatives in lobbying the central
Agents wage bargaining planner of the common market
Workers Labor unions Worker lobby
Firms Employer federation Employer lobby
4The assumption on similar regions is admittedly strong, but with asymmetric regions
there is no analytical result in the model.
3
I use the common agency model (e.g. Bernheim and Whinston 1986,
Grossman and Helpman 1994a, and Dixit, Grossman and Helpman 1997) to
establish a political equilibrium with the following sequence of decisions:
1. Worker and employer lobbies make their offers to the central planner
(section 7). These offers relate the lobbies’ prospective political contri-
butions to the central planner’s policy.
2. The central planner accepts new members to the common market and
regulates the product and labor markets (section 6). Product market
regulation determines how much firms can coordinate their actions in
price settlement, and labor market regulation determines the relative
power of the labor unions in wage bargaining.
3. Unions and employers bargain over the wages (section 5).
4. Firms decide how much to invest in R&D (subsection 4.2).
5. Each firm decides on its output given its expectations on the behavior
of the other firms (subsection 4.1).
6. The households decide on their consumption (section 3).
This extended game is solved by backward induction. The outcomes of that
game are given in section 8 and 9.
3 Production and consumption
In region j ∈ {1, ..., J} of the common market, a single firm (hereafter firm
j) produces good j from labor with technology
yj = Bjnj, (1)
where yj output, nj labor input in production and Bj is the productivity pa-
rameter. I assume that all products j ∈ {1, ..., J} are perfect substitutes, for
simplicity.5 The total supply of the composite good in the common market,
5With some complication, it is possible to use a CES function here for the same purpose.
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C, is the sum of regional outputs yj:
C =
J∑
j=1
yj. (2)
The average productivity of the common market is given by
B
.
=
1
J
J∑
j=1
Bj. (3)
All households in the common market share the same preferences and take
income, the prices and the interest rate r as given. Thus, they all behave as if
there were a single representative household for the whole common market.
The household chooses its flow of consumption C to maximize its utility
starting at time T , ∫ ∞
T
(log C)e−ρ(θ−T )dθ,
where θ is time, C consumption and ρ > 0 the constant rate of time prefer-
ence. Noting (2), the this utility maximization leads to the Euler equation6
E˙/E = r − ρ with E
.
= pC = p
J∑
j=1
yj, (4)
where p the consumption price, E total consumption expenditure, r the inter-
est rate and E˙ = dE/dt. Because in the model there is no money that would
pin down the nominal price level at any time, it is convenient to normalize
the households’ total consumption expenditure in the common market, E , at
the constant number J of regions.7 This and (4) yield
E = J, p = E
/ J∑
j=1
yj = J
/ J∑
j=1
yj, r = ρ = constant > 0. (5)
Technology (1), (2) and (3) has the useful property that with symmetry
throughout the regions, nj = n for all j, total consumption is determined by
C
∣∣∣
nj=n
= JnB. (6)
6Cf. Grossman and Helpman (1994b).
7With this normalization, the equilibrium price p and the equilibrium wage w are
independent of the size of the common market, J .
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Because consumption per region, C/J , is then indifferent of the size J of
the common market, there are no scale effects on consumption. In this case,
economic integration is motivated only by rents in the goods or labor market.
4 Firms
4.1 Competition in the product market
Following Dixit (1986), I assume that each firm j anticipates the reaction of
the other firms k 6= j by
dyk/dyj = ϕyk/yj for k 6= j, (7)
where ϕ ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of the firms’ market power. If ϕ = 0, the firms
behave in Cournot manner, taking each others’ output level as given. The
higher ϕ, the more the firms can coordinate their actions and the higher price
they can charge. The central planner can decrease (increase) ϕ by intensifying
(weakening) its competition and anti-trust policies. The product market is
fully deregulated for ϕ = 0.
I assume, for simplicity, uniform initial productivity in the common mar-
ket, B0k = B
0 for all k. This implies symmetry yk = y for all k. Noting (5)
and (7), the inverse of the anticipated price elasticity of demand for firm j is
then given by
φ(J, ϕ)
.
= −
[
yj
p
dp
dyj
]
yk=y
=
[
yj∑J
k=1 yk
d
∑J
k=1 yk
dyj
]
yk=y
=
1
J
[ J∑
k=1
dyk
dyj
]
yk=y
=
1
J
[
1 + ϕ
∑
k 6=j
yk
yj
]
yk=y
=
1 + (J − 1)ϕ
J
= (1− ϕ)
1
J
+ ϕ ≥
1
J
with ∂φ/∂J = (ϕ− 1)/J2 < 0 and ∂φ/∂ϕ = 1− 1/J > 0. (8)
Firm j maximizes its profit
πj
.
= pyj − wjnj,
where yj is output, by its labor input nj holding the wage wj and productivity
Bj constant, given the production function (1) and the price elasticity of the
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demand for output, (8). Noting (5), this maximization yields the equilibrium
conditions
wj =
[
p + yj
dp
dyj
]
Bj = (1− φ)pBj =
(1− φ)J∑J
j=1 yj
Bj,
πj = pyj − wjnj = pyj − (1− φ)pBjnj = φpyj, wjnj/πj = 1/φ− 1,
J∑
j=1
wjnj = (1− φ)p
J∑
j=1
yj = (1− φ)J,
J∑
j=1
πj = φp
J∑
j=1
yj = φJ. (9)
In this setting, the firms and the workers share the value added is fixed
proportions φ and (1 − φ), respectively. Given (8), a decrease in firms’
market power ϕ or an increase in the size J of the common market intensifies
competition and decreases the firm’s share φ.
Results (9) show that labor input in production, nj, can be constant,
provided that the wage wj and the profit πj change in the same proportion.
Without this property, there could not be a steady state in the model.
4.2 Research and development (R&D)
Technological change for firm j is characterized by a Poisson process qj as
follows. During a short time interval dθ, there is an innovation dqj = 1 with
probability Λjdθ, and no innovation dqj = 0 with probability 1−Λjdθ, where
Λj is the arrival rate of innovations in the research process. The arrival rate
Λj is an increasing function of labor devoted to R&D, lj,
Λj = λl
1−ν
j , λ > 0, ν ∈ (0, 1), (10)
where λ and ν are constants. Decreasing returns to scale ν ∈ (0, 1) in R&D
are assumed to ensure the existence of equilibrium. Following Horii and
Iwaisako (2007), this can be justified by the possibility of duplication: when
two workers innovate in the same industry, they produce very likely less than
a double amount of innovations.
I denote the serial number of technology in region j by tj and variables
depending on technology tj by superscript tj. The invention of a new tech-
nology raises tj by one and the level of productivity B
tj
j by a > 1. Hence,
B
tj
j = B
0
j a
tj . (11)
7
During a short time interval dθ, there is a change in technology from tj to
tj +1 with probability Λjdθ, and no change with probability 1−Λjdθ, where
Λj is given by (10).
The average growth rate of the level of productivity (11) in the stationary
state is in fixed proportion (λ log a) to l1−νj (cf. Aghion and Howitt 1998, p.
59) and thereby an increasing function of lj. Thus, research input lj can be
used as a proxy of the growth rate in region j and the average research input
1
n
∑n
j=1 lj as a proxy of the growth rate for the whole common market.
Firm j’s dividends are given by
Πj = πj − wjlj, (12)
where πj is profit, wj the wage in region j, lj labor devoted to R&D and wjlj
expenditures on R&D. Firm j maximizes the present value of its dividends
(12) by its investment in R&D, lj, subject to technological change, given the
wage wj. The value of firm j’s optimal program at time T is
Ω(tj, wj, πj) = max
ljs.t.(10),(12)
E
∫ ∞
T
Πje
−r(θ−T )dθ, (13)
where θ is time, E the expectation operator and r the interest rate. In
Appendix A, I show this optimization leads to the two results:
(i) The ratio of dividends to profits, Πj/πj, is a decreasing function of labor
devoted to R&D, lj as follows:
Πj
πj
= cj = c(lj)
.
=
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
r + (1− a)νλl1−νj
, r + (1− a)λl1−νj > 0,
c′
.
=
dcj
dlj
=
(ν − 1)r(1− cj)cj/lj
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
< 0. (14)
This can be explained by decreasing returns to scale in R&D.
(ii) The constraint wjnj/πj = 1/φ − 1 in (9) can be transformed into the
form where labor devoted to production, nj, is a decreasing function of
the firms’ share of value added, φ, but total labor input nj + lj is an
increasing function of labor devoted to R&D, lj:
nj = n(lj, φ)
.
=
1/φ− 1
1− c(lj)
lj,
∂n
∂φ
< 0, nj + lj =
1/φ− c
1− c
lj,
∂(nj + lj)
∂lj
=
[1
φ
− c(lj)
]
ν
c(lj)
1− c(lj)
−
c′(lj)lj
1− c(lj)
> 0. (15)
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5 Wage bargaining
Because each region j possesses a fixed amount L of labor, its full-employment
constraint is given by
lj + nj ≤ L, (16)
where nj and lj are labor inputs in production and R&D, respectively.
In each region j, the workers’ wage wj is determined by bargaining be-
tween a union representing workers in economy j (hereafter union j) and a
federation representing the employers of these workers (hereafter employer
j). I assume, for simplicity, that both parties of bargaining are risk neutral.
This allows me to solve the problem as an alternating-offers game. I also as-
sume that the workers have access to perfect unemployment insurance. This
ensures that all workers in the same region behave as if there were only one
worker in that region.8 I assume, furthermore, that in the case of a dispute
there is no production, and consequently neither labor income nor profits.
The reference income is then zero for both the union and the employer.9
In wage bargaining, at each time T , labor union j maximizes the expected
present value of wages,
U(lj, φ)
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
(nj + lj)wje
−r(θ−T )dθ, (17)
and federation j maximizes the expected present value of dividends Πj,
F (lj, φ)
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
Πje
−r(θ−T )dθ = E
∫ ∞
T
c(lj)πje
−r(θ−T )dθ, (18)
8Otherwise, workers’ income distribution would affect the unions’ behavior and the
general equilibrium of the region. Because this would excessively complicate the analysis,
I ignore all distributional aspects in this study and leave them for future investigation.
9The expected wage outside the firm is commonly assumed to be the union’s reference
point, but this is not quite in line with the microfoundations of the alternating offers
game. Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) state (pp. 177, 185-6) that the the
reference income should not be identified with the outside option point. Rather, despite
the availability of these options, it remains appropriate to identify the reference income
with the income streams accruing to the parties in the course of the dispute. For example,
if the dispute involves a strike, these income streams are the employee’s income from
temporary work, union strike funds, and similar sources, while the employer’s income
might derive from temporary arrangements that keeps the business running.
9
subject to the full-employment constraint (16) and the firms’ behavior as a
producer and an investor. The outcome of this bargaining can be obtained
through maximizing the Generalized Nash Product
Uαj F
1−α
j , α ∈ [0, 1], (19)
by the wage wj, where α is relative union bargaining power. Because α de-
pends on the regulations of the common market,10 I assume that the central
planner of the common market uses α as the policy instrument. In Appendix
B, the maximization of the Generalized Nash Product (19) yields the follow-
ing equilibrium condition. If there is any unemployment, both the relative
union bargaining power α and the firms’ share of valued added, φ, promote
R&D and growth:
lj = ℓ(α, φ) for lj + nj < L,
∂ℓ
∂α
> 0,
∂ℓ
∂φ
> 0, lim
α→0
(L− lj − nj) = 0.
(20)
The greater the firm’s share of value added or the higher union wages, more
incentives the firm has to increase the productivity of labor through R&D.
6 The common market
I consider a symmetric equilibrium with B0j = B
0, in which case
nj = n, lj = l, wj = w and πj = π.
In that equilibrium, noting (15) and (20), the full-employment constraint
(16) and the constraint α ≤ 1 can be written as:
L ≥ l + n(l, φ), ℓ(1, φ) ≥ ℓ(α, φ) = l. (21)
10The microfoundations of relative union bargaining power as follows (cf. Binmore,
Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1986): When two players are making alternating offers to each
other, they behave so as to maximize a weighed geometric average of their utilities – the
Generalized Nash product. The weights of such an average, which reflect the relative
bargaining power of the parties, are determined by the parameters of the model. Labor
market regulation influences union power through these parameters.
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From (9) and (15) it follows that
wn =
1
J
J∑
j=1
wjnj = 1− φ, π =
1
J
J∑
j=1
πj = φ,
(n + l)w = (1 + l/n)wn = (1− cφ)wn/(1− φ) = 1− c(l)φ. (22)
By (1), (5), (14) and (15), I define the present value of the expected flow of
real income per region, y, as (cf. Aghion and Howitt 1998, p. 61)
Ψ(l, φ)
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
1
p
e−r(θ−T )dθ = E
∫ ∞
T
(
1
J
J∑
j=1
yj
)
e−r(θ−T )dθ
= E
∫ ∞
T
ye−r(θ−T )dθ = E
∫ ∞
T
Bne−r(θ−T )dθ =
B(T )n
r + (1− a)λl1−ν
=
(
1
φ
− 1
)
ψ(l), ψ(l)
.
=
B(T )l/[1− c(l)]
r + (1− a)λl1−ν
,
ψ′
ψ
=
d logψ
dl
=
1
l
+
c′
1− c
−
(1− ν)(1− a)λl−ν
r + (1− a)λl1−ν
=
1
l
+
(ν − 1)r/l
r + (1− a)λl1−ν
c−
(1− ν)(1− a)λl−ν
r + (1− a)λl1−ν
>
1
l
+
(ν − 1)r/l
r + (1− a)λl1−ν
−
(1− ν)(1− a)λl−ν
r + (1− a)λl1−ν
=
1
l
+
ν − 1
l
=
ν
l
> 0,
∂Ψ/∂l = (1/φ− 1)ψ′ > 0. (23)
Holding the firms’ share of value added, φ, constant, a higher level of R&D
(i.e. a bigger l) speeds up growth and increases thereby the present value of
the expected flow of real income, Ψ.
The unions and the firms lobby the central planner which decides on
the firms’ market power ϕ, the unions’s relative bargaining power α and
new members of the common market (i.e. the size J of the common market).
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994a), I assume that the central planner
has its own interests and collects contributions Ru and Rf from the union and
employer lobbies. A member of the worker lobby earns wages (n+ l)w minus
political contributions Ru. A member of the employer lobby earn dividends
Π minus political contributions Ru. Because the effects through the the price
level p can be internalized at the level of the common market, the worker
lobby maximizes the present value U of the expected flow of a typical worker’s
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real income [(n+ l)w−Ru]/p, and the employer lobby maximizes the present
value F of the expected flow of a typical firm’s real dividends (Π − Rf )/p
at time T . Noting (14), (20), (22) and (23), these targets can be defined as
follows:
U
(
ℓ
(
α, φ(J, ϕ)
)
, φ(J, ϕ), Ru
)
= U(l, φ, Ru)
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
(n + l)w −Ru
p
e−r(θ−T )dθ
= Ψ[(n + l)w −Ru] = Ψ(l, φ)[1− c(l)φ−Ru], (24)
F
(
ℓ
(
α, φ(J, ϕ)
)
, φ(J, ϕ), Ru
)
= F(l, φ, Rf )
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
Π−Rf
p
e−r(θ−T )dθ
= Ψ[Π−Rf ] = Ψ[c(l)π −Rf ] = Ψ(l, φ)[c(l)φ−Rf ], (25)
where
U(l, φ, Rf ) + F(l, φ, Rf ) = (1−Ru −Rf )Ψ(l, φ). (26)
Noting (23), the present value the expected flow of the real political con-
tributions at time T is given by
E
∫ ∞
T
Ru + Rf
p
e−r(θ−T )dθ = Ψ(l, φ)(Ru + Rf ). (27)
Given this and (26), I specify the central planner’s utility function as follows:
G
(
ℓ
(
α, φ(J, ϕ)
)
, φ(J, ϕ), Ru, Rf
)
= G(l, φ, Ru, Rf )
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
Ru + Rf
p
e−r(θ−T )dθ + ζwU(l, φ, Ru) + ζfF(l, φ, Rf )
= Ψ(l, φ)(Ru + Rf ) + ζw)U(l, φ, Ru) + ζfF(l, φ, Rf )
= Ψ(l, φ) + (ζw − 1)U(l, φ, Ru) + (ζf − 1)F(l, φ, Rf ), (28)
where constants ζw ≥ 0 and ζf ≥ 0 are weights of the worker’s and the firm’s
welfare in the government’s preferences, respectively.
Grossman and Helpman’s (1994a) objective function (28) is widely used in
models of common agency and it has been justified as follows. The politicians
are mainly interested in their own income which consists of the contributions
from the public, Ru + Rf , but because they must defend their position in
general elections, they must sometimes take the utilities of the interest groups
U(l, φ, Ru) and F(l, φ, Rf ) into account directly. The linearity of (28) in
Ψ[Ru + Rf ] is assumed, for simplicity.
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7 The political equilibrium
I assume for a while that the central planner can smoothly regulate unions’
and firms’ market power (α, ϕ). The results can then be extended for the
case where the central planner’s choices are more discrete.
Because the functions φ(J, ϕ) and ℓ
(
α, φ(J, ϕ)
)
in (24), (25) and (28)
establish one-to-one correspondence from the central planner’s instruments
(α, ϕ) to the vector (l, φ), one can in the model consider labor devoted to
R&D (= the measure of the growth rate, cf. subsection 4.2) l and the firms’
share of value added, φ, as the central planner’s policy variables. The unions’
and employers’ lobbies try to affect the central planner by their contributions
Ru and Rf . The contribution schedules are therefore functions of the central
planner’s policy variables:
Ru(l, φ), Rf (l, φ). (29)
The central planner maximizes its utility function (28) by (l, φ), given
the contribution schedules (29) and the constraints (8) and (21). Following
proposition 1 of Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium for this game is a set of contribution schedules Ru(l, φ) and
Rf (l, φ) and policy (l, φ) such that the following conditions (i)− (iv) hold:
(i) Contributions Ru and Rf are non-negative but no more than the con-
tributor’s income.
(ii) The policy (φ, l) maximizes the central planner’s welfare (28) taking the
contribution schedules Ru and Rf as given,
(l, φ) ∈ arg max
(l, φ) s.t. (8) and (21)
G(l, φ, Ru
(
l, φ), Rf (l, φ)
)
;
(iii) The worker lobby (employer lobby) cannot have a feasible strategy
Ru
(
l, φ) (Rf
(
l, φ)) that yields it a higher level of utility than in equi-
librium, given the central planner’s anticipated decision rule,
(l, φ) = arg max
(l, φ) s.t. (8) and (21)
U(l, φ, Ru(l, φ)
)
,
(l, φ) = arg max
(l, φ) s.t. (8) and (21)
F(l, φ, Rf (l, φ)
)
. (30)
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(iv) The worker lobby (employer lobby) provides the central planner at
least with the level of utility than in the case it offers nothing Ru = 0
(Rf = 0), and the central planner responds optimally given the other
lobby’s contribution function,
G
(
l, φ, Ru(l, φ), Rf (l, φ)
)
≥ max
(l, φ) s.t. (8) and (21)
G(l, φ, Ru(l, φ), 0
)
,
G
(
l, φ, Ru(l, φ), Rf (l, φ)
)
≥ max
(l, φ) s.t. (8) and (21)
G
(
l, φ, 0, Rf (l, φ)
)
.
Noting (29) and (30), the central planner’s utility function (28) changes into
G(l, φ)
.
= G(l, φ, Ru(l, φ), Rf (l, φ))
= Ψ(l, φ) + (ζw − 1) max
(l, φ) s.t. (8) and (21)
U(l, φ, Ru(l, φ))
+ (ζf − 1) max
(l, φ) s.t. (8) and (21)
F(l, φ, Rf (l, φ)),
∂G/∂l = ∂Ψ/∂l, ∂G/∂φ = ∂Ψ/∂φ. (31)
The Lagrangean for the maximization of the central planner’s utility func-
tion (31) by (l, φ) subject to the constraints (8) and (21) is given by
H = G(l, φ) + η[φ− 1/J ] + ε[L− l − n(l, φ)] + ϑ[ℓ(1, φ)− l], (32)
where the multipliers ε and ϑ are subject to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
η[φ− 1/J ] = 0, η ≥ 0, ε[L− l − n(l, φ)] = 0, ε ≥ 0,
ϑ[ℓ(1, φ)− l] = 0, ϑ ≥ 0. (33)
Noting (15), (20), (23), (31) and (32), the first-order conditions for the max-
imization of the central planner’s utility are the following:
∂H
∂φ
=
∂G
∂φ
+ η − ε
∂n
∂φ
+ ϑ
∂ℓ
∂φ
=
∂Ψ
∂φ︸︷︷︸
−
+η − ε
∂n
∂φ︸︷︷︸
−
+ϑ
∂ℓ(1, φ)
∂φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
= 0, (34)
∂H
∂l
=
∂G
∂l
− ε
[
1 +
∂n
∂l︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]
− ϑ =
∂Ψ
∂l︸︷︷︸
+
−ε
[
1 +
∂n
∂l︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]
− ϑ = 0. (35)
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8 Economic integration
I consider now how the structure of the common market depends on economic
integration. If the size of the common market is very small, J ≤ 1/φ, then
the firms’ share of value added is determined by φ = 1/J . In that case, by
(32) and (33), η > 0 and ∂H/∂J = η/J2 > 0 hold true. If the common
market is large enough, J > 1/φ, then, by (32), (33), φ > 1/J , η = 0 and
∂H/∂J = η/J2 ≡ 0 hold true. These result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 1 A small common market J ≤ 1/φ expands (i.e. J increases),
whenever possible. A large common common market J > 1/φ is indifferent
to new members.
Concerning labor market regulation, there are two possibilities:
(a) If the labor market is deregulated, α → 0, then, by (20), there is full
employment L = l + n(l, φ). In that case, there cannot be monopoly
unions α = 1 that can dictate wages and, by (20), (33) and (34),
ℓ(1, φ) > l, ϑ = 0, ε = ∂Ψ
∂l
/(1 + ∂n
∂l
) > 0 hold true.
(b) Otherwise, when α is sufficiently large, the labor market is regulated,
there is unemployment L > l + n(l, φ) and, by (20), (33) and (34),
ε = 0, ϑ = ∂Ψ
∂l
> 0, ℓ(1, φ) = l and α = 1 hold true.
Proposition 2 The labor market is either (a) deregulated with full employ-
ment or (b) fully regulated with monopoly unions.
The central planner can increase its welfare either (a) by increasing the level
of income or (b) by speeding up economic growth. If (a) is more effective
than (b), then the central planner eliminates union power altogether to have
full employment. On the other hand, if (b) is more effective than (a), then
the central planner supports labor unions to promote cost-escaping R&D.
For a small common market with full employment, it is true that φ = 1/J
and L = l+n(l, φ) = l+n(l, 1/J). Differentiating the latter equation totally,
and noting (8) and (15), one obtains
dl
dJ
=
dn
dφ︸︷︷︸
−
1
J2︸︷︷︸
+
/[
1 +
∂n
∂l︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]
< 0.
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For a small common market with unemployment, it is true that φ = 1/J and
l = ℓ(1, φ) = ℓ(1, 1/J). Differentiating the latter equation totally, and noting
(20), one obtains
dl
dJ
= −
dℓ
dφ︸︷︷︸
+
1
J2︸︷︷︸
+
< 0.
These two results can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 3 When the common market is small, J ≤ 1/φ, economic in-
tegration (i.e. J increases) hampers R&D and growth (i.e. l falls).
In a small common market, economic integration intensifies product market
competition, decreases the firms’ share of value added, φ, and increases labor
devoted to production. This crowds out labor devoted to R&D (cf. case (a))
and reduces the firms’ incentives to increase the productivity of labor through
R&D (cf. case (b)). In both cases, R&D and the growth rate fall.
For a large common market, J > 1/φ, the central planner cannot maintain
the firms’s share of value added high enough without letting the firms’ to
coordinate their actions (i.e. ϕ > 0). Because this makes the firms’ share
of value added, φ, the full-employment constraint L ≥ l + n(l, φ) and the
equilibrium condition of the labor union, l = ℓ(1, φ), independent of J , there
is no link from J to the growth rate l. I conclude this as follows:
Proposition 4 In a large common market, J > 1/φ, economic integration
(i.e. a bigger J) has no effect on the level of R&D, l, and the growth rate.
When the central planner can control the intensity of product market compe-
tition by its competition policy (i.e. by ϕ), it is indifferent to new members.
9 Binding deregulation
Where the labor market is deregulated α → 0 by a constitution or an in-
ternational agreement that binds the central planner, the full employment
constraint (21) holds as an equality. In that case, the development patterns
are the same as in the full-employment scenario (a) in section 8.
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Assume that the product market is deregulated (ϕ = 0 and φ = 1/J) by
a constitution or an international agreement that binds the central planner.
To implement the equality constraint φ = 1/J , I introduce the inequality
φ ≤ 1/J , which is opposite to the inequality (8), into the central plan-
ner’s maximization problem. The maximization of the Lagrangean (32) by
(φ, l, η, ε, ϑ) with respect to φ ≤ 1/J leads to another Lagrangean
H˜ = H + µ[1/J − φ], (36)
where the multiplier µ satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
µ[1/J − φ] = 0, µ ≥ 0. (37)
The development patterns are the same as with a small common market
in the preceding section. Noting (34) and (35), the maximization of the new
Langrangean (36) with respect to (φ, l) yields the first-order conditions
∂H˜
∂φ
=
∂H
∂φ
− µ =
∂Ψ
∂φ︸︷︷︸
−
+η − ε
∂n
∂φ︸︷︷︸
−
+ϑ
∂ℓ(1, φ)
∂φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
−µ = 0, (38)
∂H˜
∂l
=
∂H
∂φ
=
∂Ψ
∂l︸︷︷︸
+
−ε
[
1 +
∂n
∂l︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]
− ϑ = 0. (39)
Now assume that the common market expands large enough, J → ∞ and
φ = 1/J → 0. In that case, by (15) and (33), one obtains
lim
φ→0
[L− l − n(l, φ)] = 0, lim
φ→0
ε > 0, lim
φ→0
ϑ = 0. (40)
Solving for ε and µ from (38) and (39) and noting (15), (23) and (40) yield
lim
φ→0
ε = lim
φ→0
∂Ψ
∂l
[
∂(n + l)
∂l
]−1
= lim
φ→0
(1
φ
− 1
)
ψ′(l)
[
∂(n + l)
∂l
]−1
= lim
φ→0
(1
φ
− 1
)
ψ′(l)
{[1
φ
− c(l)
]
ν
c(l)
1− c(l)
−
c′(l)l
1− c(l)
}−1
= lim
φ→0
(1− φ)ψ′(l)
{[
1− φc(l)
]
ν
c(l)
1− c(l)
− φ
c′(l)l
1− c(l)
}−1
= (1/c− 1)ψ′/ν > 0,
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lim
φ→0
µ = lim
φ→0
[
∂Ψ
∂φ
+ η − ε
∂n
∂φ
+ ϑ
∂ℓ(1, φ)
∂φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]
≥ lim
φ→0
[
∂Ψ
∂φ
− ε
∂n
∂φ
]
= −
ψ(l)
φ2
+
limφ→0 ε
φ2
l
1− c(l)
=
ψ
φ2
[
l
1− c(l)
limφ→0 ε
ψ(l)
− 1
]
=
ψ
φ2
[
l
νc(l)
ψ′(l)
ψ(l)
− 1
]
>
ψ
φ2
(
1
c
− 1
)
> 0.
From this and (36) it follows that a common market which has enough regions
(i.e. J large enough) has no incentives to take in new members:
lim
J→∞
∂H˜
∂J
= lim
φ→0
∂H˜
∂J
= − lim
φ→0
µ
J2
< 0.
The results can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 5 Where product market deregulation is binding, there is an
upper limit for economic integration and, in the case of full employment, the
growth rate diminishes with the extent of integration.
Where product market is deregulated, economic integration intensifies com-
petition, decreases the firms’ share of value added, φ, and increases labor
devoted to production. This crowds out labor devoted to R&D and decreases
the firms’ incentives to increase the productivity of labor through R&D. In
both cases, R&D and the growth rate fall. When the growth rate falls low
enough, it starts decreasing the central planner’s welfare.
10 Conclusions
This paper examines a common market with a large number of regions, each
producing a different good. The market expands by integrating new regions.
Firms improve their productivity through investment in R&D. The less there
are firms in the common market or the more they can coordinate their actions,
the higher their profits. All workers are unionized and their wages depend on
relative union bargaining power. If this power is high enough, then there is
involuntary unemployment. Both workers and firms lobby the central planner
of the common market which affects firms’ and unions’ market power and
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decides on new members to the common market. The main findings of the
paper can be summarized the follows.
Unions’ and firms’ market power decreases the level of income at each
moment of time. On the other hand, the greater the firm’s share of value
added or the higher union wages, more incentives the firm has to increase the
productivity of labor through R&D. In this respect, there can be an optimal
amount of unions’ and firms’ market power in the common market.
The decision on accepting new members depends on institutions. When
a common market is small, the small number of competing firms increases a
firm’s share of value-added. In that case, it is not in the central planner’s
interests to increase the firms’ market power furthermore by letting them
to coordinate their actions. A small common market is willing to expand,
because this decreases the firms’ market power and intensifies competition.
When a common market is large, the number of competing firms is large and
their share of value-added is small. In that case, it is in the policy maker’s
interests to let the firms coordinate their actions. Because the central planner
can fully regulate the intensity of competition by its competition and anti-
trust policy, it is indifferent for taking in new members.
Concerning the regulation of relative union bargaining power, the central
planner can increase its welfare either (a) by increasing the level of income or
(b) by speeding up economic growth. If (a) is more effective than (b), then the
central planner eliminates union power altogether to have full employment.
On the other hand, if (b) is more effective than (a), then the central planner
supports labor unions to promote cost-escaping R&D.
When the labor market is deregulated either by constitution or an inter-
national agreement that binds the central planner, the development patters
are the same as in the case of full employment above. When the product
market is regulated either by constitution or an international agreement that
binds the central planner, the firms’ market power and share of value-added
is determined wholly by the size of the common market. Because there is
an optimal level for the firms’ value-added, there must be an upper limit for
economic integration. When the common market expands, the firms’ share of
value-added decreases. In that case, the firms’ have less incentives for R&D,
and, ultimately, the growth rate decreases.
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Appendix
A. The functions (14) and (15)
From (9) and (11) it follows that
π
tj+1
j /π
tj
j = B
tj+1
j /B
tj
j = a. (41)
The Bellman equation corresponding to (13) is given by11
rΩ(tj, wj) = max
lj
{
Πj + Λj
[
Ω(tj + 1, wj, πj)− Ω(tj, wj, πj)
]}
= max
lj
{
πj − wjlj + λl
1−ν
j
[
Ω(tj + 1, wj, πj)− Ω(tj, wj, πj)
]}
. (42)
The first-order condition corresponding to this is given by
(1− ν)λl−νj
[
Ω(tj + 1, wj, πj)− Ω(tj, wj, πj)
]
= wj. (43)
I try the solution
Πj = cjπj, cj ∈ (0, 1), Ω = Πj/δj, (44)
in which dividends Πj is in fixed proportion cj to profits πj, and the subjective
discount factor δj > 0 is independent of income πj. Given (41) and (44), one
obtains
Ω˜
.
= Ω(tj + 1, wj, πj) = cjπ
tj+1
j /δj = acjπ
tj
j /δj = aΩ(tj, wj, πj). (45)
Inserting this and (44) into (42), one obtains r = Πj/Ω + λl
1−ν
j
(
Ω˜/Ω− 1
)
=
δj + (a− 1)λl
1−ν
j and
δj = r + (1− a)λl
1−ν
j > 0. (46)
From (44) and (12) it follows that
wjlj = πj − Πj = (1/cj − 1)Πj = (1− cj)πj. (47)
Inserting (44), (45), (46) and (47) into (43), one obtains
(a− 1)(1− ν)λ = (1− ν)λ
(
Ω˜
Ω
− 1
)
=
wj
Ω
lνj =
wjδj
Πj
lνj
=
δj
lj
( 1
cj
− 1
)
lνj =
( 1
cj
− 1
)
δjl
ν−1
j = [rl
ν−1
j + (1− a)λ]
1− cj
cj
.
11cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Wa¨lde (1999).
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Differentiating the logarithm of this equation totally yields
(ν − 1)rlν−2j dlj
rlν−1j + (1− a)λ
=
( 1
1− cj
+
1
c j
)
dcj =
dcj
(1− cj)cj
.
Noting (10), (44), (46), this equation defines the function
Πj
πj
= cj = c(lj) =
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
r + (1− a)λνl1−νj
> 0, 1− cj =
(1− ν)(a− 1)λl1−νj
r + (1− a)λνl1−νj
,
c′
.
=
dcj
dlj
=
(ν − 1)rlν−2j (1− cj)cj
rlν−1j + (1− a)λ
=
(
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
ν − 1)r
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− cj)cj /lj
r + (1− a)λl1−νj︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0. (48)
From (48) it follows that
d
dlj
[
lj
1− c(lj)
]
=
1
1− cj
+
ljc
′
(1− cj)2
=
1
1− cj
+
(ν − 1)rcj/(1− cj)
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
=
1
1− cj
[
1 +
(ν − 1)rcj
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
]
=
1
1− cj
[
1 +
(ν − 1)r
r + (1− a)λνl1−νj
]
=
ν
1− cj
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
r + (1− a)λνl1−νj
=
νcj
1− cj
> 0. (49)
Finally, noting (9), (47), (48) and (49), one obtains
nj =
(1
φ
− 1
) πj
wj
=
(1/φ− 1)lj
1− cj
=
(1/φ− 1)lj
1− c(lj)
.
= n(lj, φ),
nj + lj =
1/φ− cj
1− cj
lj,
∂(nj + lj)
∂lj
=
(1
φ
− cj
) d
dlj
[
lj
1− c(lj)
]
−
c′lj
1− cj
=
[1
φ
− c(lj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]
ν
c(lj)
1− c(lj)
− c′(lj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
lj
1− c(lj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
> 0. (50)
Results (48)-(50) imply and (14) and (15).
B. The function (20)
Because there is one-to-one correspondence between the wage wj and
labor input in R&D, lj, through (9) and (15), in the maximization of the
Generalized Nash Product Uαj F
1−α
j can be maximized by lj. Noting (9), I
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obtain that both (nj + lj)wj and Πj = cjπj grow at the same rate as Bj.
The parties’ expected utilities (17) and (18) can then be transformed into
the following form (cf. Aghion and Howitt 1998, p. 61)
U(lj, φ) =
Bj(T )(nj + lj)wj
Bj[r + (1− a)λl
1−ν
j ]
, F (lj, φ) =
Bj(T )c(lj)πj
Bj[r + (1− a)λl
1−ν
j ]
. (51)
Given (9), (14), (15) and (51), the outcome of bargaining is obtained
through maximizing by lj the following increasing transformation of the Gen-
eralized Nash product Uαj F
1−α
j :
Γj(lj, C, α)
.
= log
[
Uαj F
1−α
j
]
= α log Uj + (1− α) log Fj
= α log
[
(nj + lj)wjB
−1
j
]
+ (1− α) log
[
c(lj)πjB
−1
j
]
− log
[
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
]
+ ∆
= α log(1 + lj/nj) + α log
[
wjnjB
−1
j
]
+ (1− α) log
[
wjnjB
−1
j
]
(1− α) log c(lj)− log
[
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
]
+ ∆
= α log(1 + lj/nj) + log
[
wjnjB
−1
j
]
+ (1− α) log c(lj)
− log
[
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
]
+ ∆
= α log(1 + lj/nj) + log nj + (1− α) log c(lj)− log
[
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
]
+ ∆
= α log
[
1 +
1− c(lj)
1/φ− 1
]
+ log lj − log
[
1− c(lj)
]
+ (1− α) log c(lj)− log
[
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
]
+ ∆
= α log[1/φ− c(lj)] + log lj − log
[
1− c(lj)
]
+ (1− α) log c(lj)
− log
[
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
]
+ ∆ with r + (1− a)λl1−νj > 0, (52)
where ∆ denotes terms that are independent of lj, subject to the constraint
lj + n(lj, φ) ≤ L. The Lagrangean of this problem is given by
Lj = Γj(lj, C, α) + β[L− lj − n(lj, φ)], (53)
where the multiplier β satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
β[L− lj − n(lj, φ)] = 0, β ≥ 0. (54)
Noting (52), (53) and (54), one obtains the first-order condition
∂Lj
∂lj
=
∂Γj
∂lj
− β
[
1 +
∂n
∂lj
]
= 0, (55)
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where
∂Γj
∂lj
=
1
lj
+
c′(lj)
1− c(lj)
+ (1− α)
c′(lj)
c(lj)
−
αc′(lj)
1/φ− c(lj)
+
(1− ν)(a− 1)λl−νj
r + (1− a)λljl
1−ν
j
.
(56)
which defines the function
lj = ℓ(α, φ) for lj + nj < L. (57)
Noting
∂2Γj
∂lj∂α
= −
c′
c
−
c′
1/φ− c
> 0,
∂2Γj
∂lj∂φ
= −
αc′
(1− φc)2
> 0,
and the second-order condition ∂2Γj/∂l
2
j < 0 for lj + nj < L, one obtains
∂ℓ
∂α
= −
∂2Γj
∂lj∂α
/
∂2Γj
∂l2j
> 0 and
∂ℓ
∂φ
= −
∂2Γj
∂lj∂φ
/
∂2Γj
∂l2j
> 0 for lj + nj < L.
(58)
From (14), (53), (54), (55) and (56) it follows that
lim
α→0
∂Γj
∂lj
=
1
lj
+
c′
1− c
+
c′
c
+
(1− ν)(a− 1)λl−νj
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
=
1
lj
+
c′/c
1− c
+
(1− ν)(a− 1)λl−νj
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
=
c′/c
1− c
+
1
lj
r + (1− a)νλl1−νj
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
=
(ν − 1)r/lj
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
+
1
lj
r + (1− a)νλl1−νj
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
=
ν
lj
r + (1− a)λl−νj
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
=
ν
lj
> 0,
(
lim
α→0
β
)
lim
α→0
(
1 +
∂n
∂lj︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)
= lim
α→0
∂Γj
∂lj
> 0, lim
α→0
β > 0, lim
α→0
(L− lj − nj) = 0.
(59)
Results (57), (58) and (59) imply (20).
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